Abstract

At the base of the economy as the other social sciences is always a theory of the actor. It identifies the salient characteristics of the subjects who, through their actions, give origin to the collective phenomena social and economic in nature. Among these features the most relevant are those that explain the origin of the behavior of the actor: because he acts in a certain way; what are the effects of context on his choice; what are the principles that guide or characterize its decisions.

Ultimately every action refers, explicitly or implicitly, to a theory of the mind. It represents, in a more or less detailed and direct causal variables responsible for generating the action. Generally in the economy the theory of the mind is not described explicitly and complete. It is in fact particularly psychological indications executions or implicit assumptions that are deducted from the principles of choice attributed to the plaintiff by the postulates of economic theory.

Keywords: developing country, economic development, growth, innovation, technological change.

JEL Classification: Z13, A2.

Cite as: Greco, F. (2017). The analysis of choice in the decision-making process of the agents. Business Ethics and Leadership, 1(4), 22-27. DOI: 10.21272/bel.1(4).22-27.2017

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