Abstract

This paper summarizes the arguments and counterarguments within the scientific discussion on the central bank independence and central bank transparency interaction. he main purpose of the research is to define the substantial relationships between central banks’ independence and transparency based on scientific research results. Systematization literary sources and approaches for the definition of central banks independence and transparency indicate that there is no generalized approach to the hierarchy of these concepts. Existing empirical studies have shown that the independence and transparency of the central bank can be interconnected components to increase the effectiveness and flexibility to solve tasks regarding the provision of currency stability and financial stability in general. Methodological tools of the research methods are Google Trends and VOSviewer instruments. The presented results of an empirical analysis of trends regarding the dynamics of the search query number by the keywords “central bank independence” and “central bank transparency” show a decrease from 2004 to the present, with a significant predominance of central bank independence over transparency throughout the study period. The results of bibliometric analysis of keyword coincidence while writing scientific articles show that researchers of the central bank independence very rarely link its solution with the transparency aspects study, while researchers of central bank transparency often study this problem in direct connection with their independence analysis. Along with this, the issues of transparency of central banks are often studied simultaneously with the analysis of their independence. The research empirically confirms and theoretically proves that the central bank’s independence is the primary category that creates the conditions for the study of its transparency. The study results provide a scientific ground to study the strength and direction of the relationship between the levels of transparency and independence of the central bank, identifying quantitative indicators to describe these relationships and can be useful for further research to ensure the central bank efficiency.

Keywords: Bibliometric Analysis, Central Bank, Coincidence, Google Trends, Independence, Interaction, Transparency, VoSviewer.

JEL Classification: E58, F65, G20, P34.

Cite as: Dudchenko, V.Yu. (2020). Interaction of Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Bibliometric Analysis. Business Ethics and Leadership, 4(2), 109-115. https://doi.org/10.21272/bel.4(2).109-115.2020.

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